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HUMAN RIGHTS PROTECTION: THE ROLE OF INSTITUTIONAL 
CAPACITY AND SELECTIVE ADAPTATION* 
Pitman B. Potter 
Institute of Asian Research and Peter A. Allard School of Law 
 University of British Columbia 
 
We have examined previously the role of institutional capacity and selective adaptation in 
the interaction between international rule regimes on trade and human rights and local 
norms and practices, in the context of globalization. 1  This work is ongoing, through 
archival and survey research on the relationship between acceptance of globalized rule 
regimes among interpretive communities charged with interpreting, applying, and 
enforcing non-local rules, and the resilience of local norms. This paper will examine the 
potential application of selective adaptation and institutional capacity to understanding of 
international human rights norms and practices.  
I. Protection of Human Rights: Issues of Institutional Capacity 
Enforcement of international human rights norms depends on the capacity of intermediary 
institutions. Institutional capacity refers to the ability of institutions to perform their 
assigned tasks. Institutional capacity has been examined from relational perspectives that 
focus on issues of responsibility between organizations and their constituencies; efficiency 
in performance and the use of resources; and accountability to varying sources of 
authority.2 Functional perspectives have also been applied to the question of institutional 
capacity, in such areas as access to information; effectiveness and methods of 
communication; organizational symmetry; and ability to enforce rules and directives.3 
                                                 
* This paper was prepared as a working paper in 2005 for a conference at Mofid University in Qom, Iran. I 
did not attend the conference due to human rights abuses in Iran. This working paper has not been published 
or updated, although parts have been updated and included in subsequent publications. 
1 Pitman B. Potter, “Legal Reform in China: Institutions, Culture, and Selective Adaptation” (2004) 29:2 Law 
& Social Inquiry 465 at 465–95. 
2 H.V. Savitch, “Global Challenge and Institutional Capacity: Or How We Can Refit Local Administration 
for the Next Century” (1998) 30:3 Administration & Society 248 at 248–73. 
3 William Blomquist and Elinor Ostrom, “Institutional Capacity and the Resolution of a Commons Dilemma” 
in Michael D. McGinnis, ed., Polycentric Governance and Development: Readings from the Workshop in 
Political Theory and Policy Analysis (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1999). 
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However useful these approaches may be in the abstract, actual institutional performance 
remains contingent on domestic political and socio-economic conditions. 4  In many 
economies, local conditions of rapid socio-economic and political transformation pose 
particular challenges for institutional capacity. Accordingly, institutional capacity in China 
may usefully be examined by reference to issues of institutional location, orientation, 
cohesion, and most importantly institutional purpose.  
Institutional capacity also depends on issues of Geographical Location, particularly the 
question of balancing central authority with decentralization of social and economic 
development initiatives. 5  Many societies exhibit tension between local and central 
authorities and among the regions. The practical divisions of power and authority between 
local and central government departments permit an interplay of power and politics 
between the central and sub-national governments that echoes practices of federalism. Yet 
this may conflict with state-directed ideals of conformity and unity. In the process of 
bargaining that accompanies the allocation of resources and the distribution of costs and 
benefits of policy initiative, requirements of submission to the unified state may limit the 
flexibility of local officials. Rigid adherence to contested ideals of unitary authority also 
may limit the ability of legal institutions at both local and national levels to exercise even 
limited autonomy in support of predictability and stability in socio-economic and political 
relations. As a result institutional capacity of the legal system more broadly suffers. In the 
human rights context, this may affect the ability of local institutions to carry out central 
government edicts purporting to protect human rights. 
Institutional capacity also depends on Institutional Orientation. Orientation refers to the 
priorities and habitual practices that inform institutional performance. For human rights 
institutions, orientation involves particularly the tension between formal and informal 
modes of operation. Much has been written on the role of informal networks as vehicles 
for socio-economic regulation and development. Informal networks may serve as a 
                                                 
4 P. Healey, “Building Institutional Capacity through Collaborative Approaches to Urban Planning” (1998) 
30:9 Environment & Planning 1531 at 1531–46; Lisa L. Martin and Beth A. Simmons, “Theories and 
Empirical Studies of International Institutions” (1998) 52:4 Int’l Org 729 at 729–57. 
5  James S. Wunsch, “Institutional Analysis and Decentralization: Developing an Analytical Model for 
Effective Third World Administrative Reform” in McGinnis, supra note 3. 
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substitute for the norms and processes associated with formal institutions, allowing more 
flexible responses to increasingly complex social, economic and political relations. 
However, the potential role of informal institutions is often challenged by development 
policies of political regime which insist on maintaining formal organizational systems to 
defend ideological orthodoxy and enforce political loyalty. The tension between statist 
ethics of formal institutionalism and local informal arrangements may work to divert 
resources from institutional performance and undermines institutional capacity. In the 
human rights context, this may undermine the ability of governments to deliver the 
opportunities for development that the right to development requires as well as the civil 
and political rights envisioned under the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. 
Finally, institutional capacity depends on issues of Institutional Coherence, involving the 
willingness of individuals within institutions to comply with edicts from organizational and 
extra-organizational leaders, and enforce institutional goals. Compliance concerns the 
recognition and enforcement of norms. 6  Conflicts arise when the norms of particular 
organizations differ from those of the individuals within these organizations—such as 
where norms of public policy that drive organizational priorities require subordination of 
parochial interests of individual officials within the organization. Often the lack of 
institutional coherence is revealed through the presence of corruption. This has an effect 
not only on the emergence of human rights abuses, which often are the result of challenges 
to arbitrary and abusive exercise of authority, and their resolution, which may require 
punishment of officials protected by extensive patronage networks. 
Of the elements of institutional capacity that affect enforcement of human rights norms, 
perhaps the most important is Institutional Purpose. Institutional purpose concerns the way 
in which the goals of institutions reflect material and ideological contexts, the availability 
and nature of financial, human and other resources, and the various limitations that attend 
institutional performance. Institutional purpose plays a significant role in determining the 
capacity of institutions to respond to socio-economic change. Political and legal institutions 
                                                 
6 Amitai Etzioni, ed., A Sociological Reader on Complex Organizations, 2d. ed. (New York: Holt, Rinehart 
and Winston, 1969); Amitai Etzioni, A Comparative Analysis of Complex Organizations (New York: Free 
Press, 1961). 
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often function according to the policy priorities imposed upon them by the local regimes. 
The “relative autonomy” ascribed to legal institutions in the European and North American 
traditions is often limited in developing economies outside the European tradition. Thus, 
the capacity of legal institutions reflects the extent of commonality of purpose between 
legal norms and processes and the policy imperatives of the local government. This 
involves a dynamic of selective adaptation. 
II. Selective Adaptation: An Overview 
As discussed previously, the notion of “selective adaptation” proceeds from assumptions 
about the importance of cultural norms in influencing behavior. Cultural norms are 
reflected in rules, including formal laws and regulations and informal procedures and 
practices. The distinction between rules and the cultural norms they represent becomes 
especially important when rules particular to one cultural group are used by another, 
without a corresponding assimilation of underlying norms. This phenomenon is reflected 
in current conditions of globalization, as liberal rules of governance generally associated 
with the Europe and North America are disseminated to other areas, but little attention is 
given to questions about local acceptance of the norms on which these rules are based.  
Selective adaptation describes a process by which practices and norms are exchanged 
across cultural boundaries. Selective adaptation is made possible by ways in which 
governments and elites express their own normative preferences in the course of 
interpretation and application of practice rules. Selective adaptation also operates within 
societies as different groups interact with and respond to dominant discourses. While 
selective adaptation explains much about the general conditions for exchange of practices, 
rules, and norms between cultural communities, more work is needed to confirm the 
operational details of selective adaptation, identify the internal components, and explain 
the implications for cross-cultural dispute resolution. 
Selective adaptation depends on a number of factors, including perception, 
complementarity, and legitimacy. Perception influences understanding about foreign and 
local norms and practices. Perceptions about the purpose, content and effect of foreign and 
local trade law norms and practices affect the processes and results of selective adaptation. 
 5 
For example, local government efforts to comply with international trade rules on 
transparency while still pursuing local policy priorities may hinge on the content and 
accuracy of perceptions about treaty norms and practices and their relationship to local 
systems. The interpretation and application of non-local rules in light of local norms thus 
depends on perceptions about both. Drawing on principles of nuclear physics, 
complementarity describes a circumstance by which apparently contradictory phenomena 
can be combined in ways that preserve essential characteristics of each component and yet 
allow for them to operate together in a mutually reinforcing and effective manner. 7 
Complementarity may allow adjustment of norms and practices of particular cultural 
communities to satisfy expectations imposed from outside, while still protecting local 
needs. For example, local compliance with international trade rules on state subsidies may 
depend on complementarity in procedure, as the formality of imported practice rules is 
reconciled with the flexibility of local performance standards. Thus, complementarity 
affects the potential for non-local rules and local norms to be mutually sustaining. 
Legitimacy concerns the extent to which members of local communities support the 
purposes and consequences of selective adaptation.8 Whereas the forms and requirements 
of legitimacy may vary, the effectiveness of selectively adapted dispute resolution norms 
and practices depends to an important degree on local acceptance. For example, if local 
economic actors challenge efforts to regulate production costs according to international 
anti-dumping rules, this will affect the possibilities for selective adaptation. Other factors, 
such as coincidence, socio-economic or political crisis, and voluntary experimentation may 
also play a role.  
 
                                                 
7 Niels H. D. Bohr, Essays, 1958-1962, on Atomic Physics and Human Knowledge (New York: Interscience 
Publishers, 1963); Richard Rhodes, The Making of the Atomic Bomb (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1986) 
at 13 et seq. 
8 Max Weber, Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretive Sociology, Guenther Roth and Claus Wittich, 
eds. (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1978); Stephen P. Turner and Regis A. 
Factor, Max Weber: The Lawyer as Social Thinker (London and New York: Routledge, 1994). 
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III. Selective Adaptation of Human Rights Norms: The Right to Development in 
Comparative Context 
 The dynamic of selective adaptation is illustrated in the ways that divergent 
international human rights norms have been accepted by developing economies.  In contrast 
to liberal norms of individual liberties and civil and political rights, many developing 
economies have emphasized the right to development. The right to development has been the 
focus of much debate and discussion, particularly in the context of its relationship to other 
human rights and in light of the economic development achievements and aspirations of states 
in the East Asian Region. 9 A comparison of two major human rights documents of 1993—
the Bangkok Declaration and the Vienna Declaration—reveals significant differences of view 
concerning the right to development and its place in international human rights law. The 
Bangkok Declaration suggested that state governments should be free to give development 
goals priority over other human rights policies, which themselves could be limited by local 
cultural and historical conditions.10 This approach was viewed with some trepidation by 
outside observers, in part because the Bangkok Declaration also suggested that the recognition 
and enforcement of human rights generally should be controlled by local governments free 
from outside scrutiny. 11  The Vienna Declaration, by contrast, stressed that the lack of 
development may not be used to justify abridgement of internationally recognized human 
rights, thus underscoring the principles accepted elsewhere that all human rights (including 
the right to development) are universal, indivisible, and interrelated.12 
The contradiction over the relationship of the right to development and its attendant 
circumstances and other human rights reveals significant philosophical differences 
concerning the nature of development and the nature of rights. While these contradictions are 
                                                 
9 See Pitman B. Potter, “The Right to Development: Philosophical Differences and Political Implications,” 
in Errol Mendes and Anne-Marie Traeholt, eds., Human Rights: Chinese and Canadian Perspectives 
(Ottawa: Human Rights Research and Education Centre, 1997). 
10 See “Final Declaration of the Regional Meeting for Asia of the World Conference on Human Rights” (1993) 
14 Hum Rts LJ 370, Art. 8 [“Bangkok Declaration”]. 
11  Ibid, Art. 24 provides that the conceptualization and eventual establishment of national human rights 
institutions should be left to the States to decide. 
12 See United Nations World Conference on Human Rights, “Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action”  
(1993) 32 ILM 1661 at 1665–66, Arts. I (5) and I (10). While the Bangkok Declaration repeated some of the 
standard doctrinal language of human rights law on universality and indivisibility, its emphasis on the 
prerogatives of state governments and the contextualization of rights marked a significant departure. 
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unlikely to be resolved in the short term, the approach to development embodied in the 
Bangkok Declaration may have less than positive political implications for authoritarian 
development regimes. More importantly, these differing perspectives play a significant role 
in the formation of institutional purpose as an element of institutional capacity. 
A. Summary of the Discourse of the Right to Development 
While it would be superfluous in the extreme to retrace in detail the genealogy of the right to 
development, a brief summary may be useful as background. It is useful as well to note the 
institutional context within which these debates take place.  
1. Recognition of the Right to Development as a Human Right 
International recognition of the right to development as a human right has often been traced 
to a speech by Mr. Justice Keba M’Baye, First President of the Senegal Supreme Court, to the 
International Institute for Human Rights in 1972.13 However, the idea has long-standing roots 
in the United Nations Charter, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights, and other international instruments.14 The politics of North-South relations 
and particularly the call for a “New International Economic Order” have contributed as well 
to assertions about the existence of a right to development. 15  Support for the right to 
development has been found in scholarly studies,16 and gradually a series of international 
                                                 
13 See Keba M’Baye, “Le Droit au developpement commen un droit de l’Homme” (1972) 5 Revue des Droits de 
l’Homme 503. See also Hector Gros Espiell, “The Right to Development as a Human Right” (1981) 16:2 Texas 
Int’l LJ 189 at 192; Russel Lawrence Barsh, “The Right to Development as a Human Right: Results of the Global 
Consultation” (1991) 13:3 Hum Rts Q 322. 
14 See e.g., Roland Y. Rich, “The Right to Development as an Emerging Human Right” (1983) 23:2 Va J Int’l L 
287; Ved P. Nanda, “The Right to Development: An Appraisal“ in Ved P. Nanda, George W. Shepherd, Jr., and 
Eileen McCarthy-Arnolds, eds., World Debt and the Human Condition: Structural Adjustments and the Right to 
Development (New York: Greenwood Press, 1992) at 41–61. 
 15 For a useful collection of articles presented at a 1991 seminar convened in Calcutta by the Committee on Legal 
Aspects of the New International Economic Order of the International Law Association, see Subrata Roy 
Chowdhury, Erik M.G. Denters, & Paul J.I.M. de Waart, eds., The Right to Development in International Law 
(Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff, 1992). Also see Mohammed Bedjaoui, “Some Unorthodox Reflections on the 
‘Right to Development’” in Francis Snyder & Peter Slinn, ed., International Law of Development: Comparative 
Perspectives (Abingdon: Professional Books, 1987) at 87–116. 
    16 Among the earliest and most articulate proponents of the right to development have been Roland Rich and 
Philip Alston. See e.g. Rich, “The Right to Development as an Emerging Human Right” supra note 14 and 
Roland Rich, “The Right to Development: A Right of Peoples?” in James Crawford, ed., The Rights of Peoples 
(Oxford: Clarendon, 1988) at 39–54; Philip Alston, “Development and the Rule of Law: Prevention versus Cure 
as a Human Rights Strategy“ in International Commission of Jurists, Development, Human Rights and the Rule 
of Law (1981) [Alston, “Development and the Rule of Law”]; Philip Alston, “Making Space for New Human 
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instruments has emerged recognizing and expanding on the right to development.17 Ideas 
about the right to development have undergone further revision in the context of the dynamic 
growth of economies in the East Asian region, and amid suggestions that these economic 
successes vindicate an “Asian” cultural approach to development that stands as an alternative 
to much of Western human rights thinking.18  
But there have been dissenting voices. Some suggest that the right to development is little 
more than an attempt by authoritarian governments to insulate their regimes from outside 
scrutiny.19 Sceptical observers also suggest that the right to development has little if any legal 
support and is in effect an attempt to enshrine the laudable goal of development as a right, 
rather than recognizing that development may be the end-product of the enforcement of 
various civil, political, economic, social and/or cultural rights, but is not (and should not be) 
a right in itself.20 Other critics have suggested that the emerging doctrine of the right to 
development gives undue attention to economic growth, which not only entrenches a flawed 
view of development generally, but also works to further the subjugation of disadvantaged 
groups for whom the right to development ought to operate most strongly.21 
A middle ground of sorts is occupied by observers who accept the notion of a right to 
development, but who insist that it operate only as a complement and not a substitute for other 
                                                 
Rights: The Case of the Right to Development” (1988) 1 Hum Rts Yrbk 3 [Alston, “Making Space”]; Philip 
Alston, “Revitalizing United Nations Work on Human Rights and Development” (1991) 18 Melbourne Univ L 
Rev 216 [Alston, “Revitalizing UN Work”]. For a critical review of Alston, see Jack Donnelly, “In Search of the 
Unicorn: The Jurisprudence and Politics of the Right to Development” (1985) 15:3 Cal W Int’l LJ 473. 
17 Of particular importance have been the UNESCO Secretary General’s Report on the Right to Development 
(E/CN.4/1334) (1979); the United Nations General Assembly’s Declaration on the Right to Development (Res 
41/128) (1986); and the UNESCO Commission on Human Rights’ Report on the Global Consultation on the 
Right to Development as a Human Right (E/CN.4/1990/9/Rev.1) (1990). 
18 Perhaps the most comprehensive articulation of the right to development in the context of the East Asian 
experience was the 1993 Bangkok Declaration, in which the emphasis was placed on local historical, cultural and 
religious conditions as context for human rights conditions. See Bangkok Declaration, supra note 10. Also see 
Susumu Awanohara, Michael Vatikiotis, and Shada Islam, “Vienna Showdown”  (June 17, 1993) Far Eastern 
Economic Review at 16. 
19 See Michael Vatikiotis and Robert Delfs, “Cultural Divide: East Asia Claims the Right to Make Its Own Rules” 
(June 17, 1993) Far Eastern Economic Review at 20. 
20 See e.g. Donnelly, supra note 16. Cf. John O’Manique, “Human Rights and Development” (1992) 14:1 Hum 
Rts Q 78; John O’Manique, “Development, Human Rights and Law” (1992) 14:3 Hum Rts Q 383. 
21 See e.g., Hilary Charlesworth, “The Public/Private Distinction and the Right to Development in International 
Law” (1992) 12 Austl YB Int’l L 190; Jonathan L. Mannina, “The Human Rights Implications of Economic 
Development: A Case Study of the Huaorani People of Ecuador” (1992) 5:1 Geo Int’l Envtl L Rev 91. 
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human rights.22 The interaction of development with other human rights has been seen to 
require that the local peoples affected by economic development projects have meaningful 
opportunities for participation and consultation. 23  The right to participation has been 
expanded yet further in an effort to suggest that it might be a basis for protection of cultural 
rights against oppression from authoritarian states.24 
2. Institutional Contexts 
 Debates over the right to development operate against a background of political 
structures that affect and often pre-determine the content of the debate. Of particular 
importance are the views of national governments, international aid agencies, non-
governmental organizations, and the scholarly community. Although there are of course 
significant interdependencies among these institutions, their identity, power, and goals each 
play a significant role in determining the content of views expressed by their representative 
interlocutors.  
As international law is the creation of states, it is not surprising that state governments have 
played a critical role in discussions of the right to development. Governments in developing 
states have been particularly eager to have a right to development recognized at the 
international level, and for institutional mechanisms for enforcement to be put in place. Thus, 
for example, the UNESCO Secretary General’s Report on the right to development 
emphasized the moral duty of industrialized states to repair the economic disparities that 
                                                 
22 The text of the 1994 Vienna Declaration stands as a forceful articulation of this view, “[w]hile development 
facilitates the enjoyment of all human rights, the lack of development may not be invoked to justify the 
abridgement of internationally recognized human rights”. See United National World Conference on Human 
Rights, “Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action” (1993) 32 ILM 1661 at 1666, Art. I (10). For scholarly 
expressions of this perspective, see e.g., Rhoda E. Howard, “Law and Economic Rights in Commonwealth 
Africa” (1985) 15:3 Cal W Int’l LJ 607; Kivutha Kibwana, “Human Rights And/Or Economic Development: 
Which Way Africa?” [1993] Third World Leg Studies 43; Wade Mansell and Joanne Scott, “Why Bother About 
a Right to Development?” (1994) 21:2 JL & Soc 171; Yemi Osinbajo and Olukonyisola Ajayi, “Human Rights 
and Economic Development” (1994) 28:3 Int’l Lawyer 727. 
23 See e.g., Konrad Ginther, “Participation and Accountability: Two Aspects of the Internal and International 
Dimension of the Right to Development” [1992] Third World Leg Studies 55; James C.N. Paul, “Law and 
Development into the ’90s: Using International Law to Impose Accountability to People on International 
Development Actors” [1992] Third World Leg Studies 1 [Paul, “Into the ’90s”]; James C.N. Paul, “The Human 
Right to Development: Its Meaning and Importance” (1992) 25:2 John Marshall L Rev 235; Daniel D. Bradlow, 
“Human Rights, Public Finance and the Development Process: A Critical Introduction” (1992) 8:1 Am Univ J 
Int’l L & Pol’y 1. 
24 See e.g., Michele L. Radin, “The Right to Development as a Mechanism for Group Autonomy: Protection of 
Tibetan Cultural Rights” (1993) 68:3 Wash L Rev 695. 
 10 
characterize their relations with developing countries, an NIEO theme that has been taken up 
repeatedly in subsequent instruments on the right to development.25  Obviously, such an 
approach to international rights and duties suits the economic interests of developing states, 
particularly where implementation mechanisms and policies are established. On the other 
hand, international instruments on the right to development also reflect the views of 
industrialized states in noting the importance of domestic development efforts.26 
Much of the discussion over the right to development has concerned efforts by international 
aid agencies to explain and justify their activities. As with most formal institutions, 
international aid agencies have organizational interests and a parochial commitment to 
continuing their work and maintaining control over it.27 Thus, aid agencies have been quick 
to respond to human rights criticisms of their work. Employees of aid agencies, while careful 
to note that they speak in their personal capacity, more often than not reflect the views of their 
employers. Thus, in response to claims that international aid should be tied to the human rights 
records of recipient counties, the General Counsel of the World Bank has argued that the 
Bank’s charter mandates an effort to promote economic development and the raising of living 
standards, without direct attention to political questions.28 As well, the point is made that the 
right to development gives the Bank’s activities a direct human rights element. In response to 
claims that they play insufficient attention to local participation, international aid agencies 
often resort to examples of linkages with local elite organizations without much reflection as 
to whether these linkages contribute to meaningful local participation. 
                                                 
 25 See UNESCO Secretary General, Report on the Right to Development, supra note 17 at 20; United Nations 
General Assembly, Declaration on the Right to Development (Res 41/128) (1986), Preamble; UNESCO 
Commission on Human Rights, Report on the Global Consultation on the Right to Development as a Human 
Right (E/CN.4/1990/9/Rev.1) (1990), Art. V (F) [UNESCO Commission on Human Rights, Report on the Global 
Consultation]. 
 26 See United Nations General Assembly, Declaration on the Right to Development, supra note 25; UNESCO 
Commission, Report on the Global Consultation, supra note 25 at Art. V (A). 
27 See generally, Robert A. Packenham, Liberal America and the Third World: Political Development Ideas in 
Foreign Aid and Social Science (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1973). 
 28 See Ibrahim F.I. Shihata, “The World Bank and Human Rights: An Analysis of the Legal Issues and the Record 
of Achievements” (1988) 17:1 Den J Int’l L & Pol’y 39; Ibrahim F.I. Shihata, “Human Rights, Development, 
and International Financial Institutions” (1992) 8:1 Am Univ J of Int’l L & Pol’y 27. Also see Mr. Shihata’s 
comments on a panel entitled “Environment, Economic Development and Human Rights: A Triangular 
Relationship?” in Proceedings of the Eighty-Second Annual Meeting of the American Society of International 
Law (1988) at 41–45. 
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The role of NGOs in the debates over the right to development has become increasingly 
important. 29  While they often are subject to repression from local governments—either 
through direct repression or through the establishment of government organized competitors 
(GO-NGOs),30—non-government organizations have often embarked on courageous efforts 
to articulate views on development matters that stand in contrast to those of state governments 
and international development agencies. 31  And while they are often accused of being 
dominated by local elites rather than broadly participatory, NGOs have shown a capacity for 
expanding the discourse of the right to development beyond the confines often imposed by 
state governments. 
While academic scholars are usually employed by universities, their loyalties are often to 
schools of thought rather than to the organizations with which they are associated. These 
loyalties play a significant role in setting the parameters for academic discussion. Thus, for 
example, scholars who criticize the right to development adopt liberal paradigms which focus 
on the individual as the primary beneficiary of political rights.32 Other critics have challenged 
the right to development through allegiance to and application of the principles of feminist 
theory.33 By contrast, those who have argued in support of the right to development have done 
so by reference to ideas about the importance of collective rights as at least equal to (and often 
with priority over) individual rights.34 In each of these lines of argument, the views expressed 
owe as much to the authors’ underlying conceptual paradigms as they do to their immediate 
research and analysis. Thus, along with the political perspectives of national governments and 
                                                 
29 See Sidney Jones, “The Organic Growth: Asian NGOs Have Come into Their Own” (June 17, 1993) Far 
Eastern Economic Review at 23. For discussion of the potential role of NGOs in human rights monitoring, see 
Ann Kent, “China and the International Human Rights Regime: A Case Study of Multilateral Monitoring, 1989–
1994” (1995) 17:1 Hum Rts Q 1. 
30 See Geoffrey Crothall, “Outlawed Dissent: The Stranglehold on Unofficial Groups” (Winter 1993) China 
Rights Forum at 8–9; Sharon Hom, “Listening for Diversity” (Winter 1993) China Rights Forum at 12–15. 
31 For discussion of the role of NGOs at the Bangkok Conference, see Sidney Jones, “Culture Clash: Asian 
Activists Counter Their Governments’ Restrictive View of Human Rights” (Summer 1993) China Rights Forum 
at 8–9, 22. See also “Mangu fei zhengfu zuzhi xuanyan (zhaiyao)” (Bangkok NGO communique: Excerpts) 
(Summer 1993) China Rights Forum at 35–36. 
32 See Jack Donnelly, “In Search of the Unicorn: The Jurisprudence and Politics of the Right to Development”, 
supra note 16. 
33 See e.g., Charlesworth, supra note 21; Marilyn Waring, “Gender and International Law: Women and the Right 
to Development” (1988–89) 12 Austl YB Int’l L 177. 
34 See e.g. Rich, “The Right to Development as an Emerging Human Right” supra note 14 and Rich, “The Right 
to Development: A Right of Peoples?”, supra note 16; Alston, “Development and the Rule of Law”, supra note 
16; Alston, “Making Space”, supra note 16; Alston, “Revitalizing UN Work”, supra note 16. 
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the institutional perspectives of aid agencies and their employees, the views of academics on 
the right to development reveal structural determinants which are not less real for their basis 
in ideas rather than organizations. 
B. The Nature of Development and the Nature of Rights 
Discussion about the right to development reflects different ideas about the nature of 
development and the nature of rights. An examination of these underlying paradigms is useful 
in understanding the broader debates about the right to development. 
1. Dimensions of Development 
Among the many points of conflict in approaches to development are the questions about the 
international dimensions of development and underdevelopment; the goals of development; 
and the implications of development for social, economic and political relations. 
a. International Dimensions of Development: The Issue of Dependency 
Between supporters and opponents of the right to development, the basic issues revolve 
around issues of international political economy. Proponents of the right to development are 
heavily influenced by the conclusions of dependency theory.35 Critics on the other hand 
suggest that dependency theory explains very little, and that local conditions offer more 
powerful explanations for development and under-development. 
The cadre of scholars broadly labelled dependency theorists, hold in general that 
underdevelopment in all its forms is due in large part to the exploitation and oppression by 
the industrialized West—first through colonialism and later through domination of the 
international finance, technology, and commodity systems.36 Early proponents of dependency 
                                                 
35 For example, the Human Rights White Paper issued by the People’s Republic of China in 1991 makes much 
of the century of colonial oppression suffered by China during the 19th and early 20th centuries. See “Text of 
Human Rights White Paper” (November 21, 1991) FBIS Daily Report - Supplement. 
36 There is a rich and wide-ranging literature on the problems of dependency. Among the most useful works are 
Paul A. Baran, The Political Economy of Growth (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1968); Andre Gunder 
Frank, Capitalism and Underdevelopment in Latin America: Historical Studies of Chile and Brazil (New York: 
Monthly Review Press, 1967); Celso Furtado, Development and Underdevelopment: A Structural View of the 
Problems of Developed and Underdeveloped Countries (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1964); Johan 
Galtung, “An Economic Theory of Imperialism” (1971) 8:2 J Peace Research 81 at 81–117; Alejandro Portes, 
“On the Sociology of National Development: Theories and Issues” (1976) 82:1 Am J Sociology 55 at 55–85; 
Immanuel Wallerstein, “The Rise and Future Demise of the World Capitalist System: Concepts for Comparative 
Analysis” (1974) 16:4 Comp Studies Soc’y & History 1 at 1–26; and Charles K. Wilber, ed., The Political 
Economy of Development and Underdevelopment, 2d ed. (New York: Random House, 1979). For a not uncritical 
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portrayed local elites rather crudely as corporatist allies of foreign capital, serving as conduits 
for investment and also as the primary local beneficiaries. 37  Their commercial and 
consumption activities are seen to support the objectives of foreign investment, by substituting 
short-term parochial goals for priorities of building the technological and infrastructural 
foundations for long-term development.38  
Critics have suggested that proponents of dependency theory have indulged in holistic 
ideological viewpoints that are not amenable to falsification or testing, even to the point of 
descending into what one observer has called a “fusion of scholarship, politics, and theatre.”39 
Rather than explain conditions and causes of underdevelopment, dependency theorists are 
accused of overlooking local political and policy causes for underdevelopment.40 Pointing to 
the successes of the East Asian newly-industrialized countries (NICs), critics of dependency 
theory have suggested that local conditions can overcome the effects of external oppression, 
even to the point of rendering it irrelevant to the question of development.41 
While arguments continue to proliferate as to the strengths and weaknesses of dependency 
theory, it remains influential in the discourses of the right to development and of human rights 
generally. Indeed, not a few East Asian political leaders have suggested that the human rights 
agenda of the West is aimed at perpetuating the dependency of the developing world.42 
                                                 
survey of the dependency literature, see Robert A. Packenham, The Dependency Movement: Scholarship and 
Politics in Development Studies (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1992) [Packenham, The 
Dependency Movement]. 
37 See generally, Fernando Henrique Cardoso and Enzo Faletto, Dependency and Development in Latin America, 
trans. Marjory Mattingly Urquidi (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1979); Paul Baran, “On the Political 
Economy of Backwardness” in Wilber, supra note 36 at 91–113. See also Charles K. Wilber and James H. 
Weaver, “Patterns of Dependency: Income Distribution and the History of Underdevelopment” in Wilber, supra 
note 36 at 114–129. For a critique, see Packenham, The Dependency Movement, supra note 36 at 93–94. 
38  See generally, Marshall R. Singer, Weak States in a World of Power: The Dynamics of International 
Relationships (New York: Free Press, 1972); Ronald Muller, “The Multinational Corporation and the 
Underdevelopment of the Third World” in Wilber, supra note 36 at 151–78. 
39 See Packenham, The Dependency Movement, supra note 36, esp. at 315. 
40 See Stephan Haggard, Pathways From the Periphery: The Politics of Growth in the Newly Industrialized 
Countries (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1990) at 19–22. 
41 See e.g., Osinbajo & Ajayi, supra note 22. 
42 See comments of Malaysian Prime Minister Datuk Seri Mahathir Mohammad in Michael Vatikiotis and Robert 
Delfs, “Cultural Divide: East Asia Claims the Right to Make Its Own Rules” (June 17, 1993) Far Eastern 
Economic Review at 20. 
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b. The Goals of Development 
 Among proponents of the right to development, there is substantial disagreement over 
the goals of development. While most scholars and international instruments agree that 
development means more than simply economic growth, some national governments have 
suggested that economic growth is the primary feature of development. 
The primary documents articulating a right to development are fairly clear that development 
entails more than simply economic growth. Thus, the UNESCO Secretary General’s Report 
indicates that development includes both material and non-material elements.43  The UN 
General Assembly Resolution on the Right to Development contains similar provisions—
indicating that development is a comprehensive phenomenon entailing economic, social, 
cultural, and political elements.44 These views are supported and reiterated by a substantial 
body of scholarly literature. In the wake of perceived failures of development policies that 
gave primacy to economic growth,45 the field of development studies has moved steadily 
toward a multi-dimensional view of development. 46  This theme appears throughout the 
literature on the right to development, which asserts consistently that development means 
more than simply economic growth.47 
Despite this apparent uniformity, a number of national governments in the East Asian region 
suggest that development means primarily if not exclusively economic growth. Thus, the 
Bangkok Declaration draws an explicit link between development and the international 
macroeconomic system.48 In its various human rights White Papers, the government of the 
                                                 
43 UNESCO Secretary General, Report on the Right to Development, supra note 17 at 13. Most recently, see the 
UNESCO Secretary General’s Position Paper delivered to the 1995 Copenhagen Summit, in which the point is 
made that development is first and foremost social, rather than economic. 
44 See United Nations General Assembly, Declaration on the Right to Development, supra note 25, Preamble and 
Art. 1. 
 45 See e.g., W.W. Rostow, “The Take-Off to Self-Sustained Economic Growth” in W.W. Rostow, ed., Stages of 
Economic Growth: A Non-Communist Manifesto (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1960). 
46A seminal work in pointing to the failures of uni-dimensional development policies was Robert A. Packenham, 
Liberal America and the Third World, supra note 27. Other influential early works were Mahbub ul Haq, The 
Poverty Curtain: Choices for the Third World (New York: Columbia University Press, 1976). 
 47 See e.g, Theo C. van Boven, “The Right to Development and Human Rights” (1982) 28 Int’l Commission 
Jurists Rev 49; Espiell, supra note 13; Rich, “The Right to Development as an Emerging Human Right”, supra 
note 14; Ved P. Nanda. “The Right to Development Under International Law: Challenges Ahead” (1985) 15:3 
Cal W Int’l LJ 431; Rhona E. Howard, “Law and Economic Rights in Commonwealth Africa” (1985) 15 Cal W 
Int’l LJ 607; Bradlow, supra note 23; Paul, “Into the ’90s”, supra note 23; Kibwana, supra note 22; Wade Mansell 
& Scott, supra note 22; Charlesworth, supra note 21. 
 48 See Bangkok Declaration, supra note 10, Preamble and Art. 18. 
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PRC explicitly adopted a position supporting the primacy of economic growth by stressing 
the right to subsistence as primary right from which all other rights derive.49 Similarly, the 
yearly reports issued by the PRC government on economic and social development give clear 
priority to economic achievement. 50  Singaporean representatives have consistently made 
clear their conclusions about the primacy of economic growth as a precursor to other aspects 
of development.51 These views stand in marked contrast to the conclusions of international 
instruments and development scholars that development must mean more than economic 
growth. More importantly, they have implications for the ways in which state governments 
address the relationship between economic development and other social, cultural and 
political relationships. 
c. Development and Social, Economic and Political Relations 
 Tied closely to notions about the goals of development are questions about the 
relationship of development to social, economic and political relations. Thus, as might be 
expected, international instruments and scholarly analyses that assert development to mean 
more than simply economic growth also argue that the pursuit of development cannot operated 
to the detriment of other human rights. The UNESCO Secretary General’s Report asserts that 
the right to development operates in tandem with other civil, political, social, cultural, and 
economic rights.52  The UN General Assembly Resolution on the Right to Development 
                                                 
49  See “Text of Human Rights White Paper” supra note 35; “The Progress of Human Rights in China,” 
(December 27, 1995) Xinhua Domestic Service, in FBIS Daily Report: China (December 28, 1996) at 8–26; 
State Council Information Office, “White Paper: Fifty Years of Progress in China’s Human Rights” (2000); 
State Council Information Office, “Progress in China’s Human Rights Cause” (2001).  
50 See e.g., “Statistical Communique of the State Statistical Bureau of the People’s Republic of China on the 1993 
National Economic and Social Development” (February 28, 1994) China Economic News, Supp. No. 3, in which 
nearly six pages of the seven page report are devoted to economic growth statistics. This pattern was repeated in 
the 1994 Communique. See “Statistical Communique of the State Statistical Bureau of the People’s Republic of 
China on the 1994 National Economic and Social Development” (March 27, 1995) China Economic News, Supp. 
No. 1. 
51 Speaking “in his personal capacity”, Kishore Mahbubani, a deputy secretary of Singapore’s Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, suggested that “[e]conomic development is the only force that can liberate the Third World”. see Kishore 
Mahbubani, “Live and Let Live: Allow Asians to Choose Their Own Course” (June 17, 1993) Far Eastern 
Economic Review at 26. Also see Chong Li Choy, Tan Chwee Huat, Wong Kwei Cheong, and Caroline Yeoh, 
eds., Business, Society and Development in Singapore (Singapore: Times Academic Press, 1990), which 
emphasizes economic and business growth as the touchstone of Singapore’s development. Similar sentiments are 
evident in Linda Low and Toh Mun Heng, eds., Public Policies in Singapore: Changes in the 1980s and Future 
Signposts (Singapore: Times Academic Press, 1992). Also see comments of Chen Heng Chee, Executive Director 
of the Singapore International Foundation in Hans De Jonge, “Democracy and Economic Development in the 
Asia-Pacific Region: The Role of Parliamentary Institutions” (1993) 14 Hum Rts LJ 301 (1993). 
52 See UNESCO Secretary General, Report on the Right to Development, supra note 17 at 13. 
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asserts that as a human right the right to development is indivisible and interdependent on 
other human rights.53 Similarly, the scholarly literature is nearly uniform in its insistence that 
the right to development cannot be used to justify denial of other human rights.54 
However, these views are contradicted by policies and behavior of various governments in 
the East Asian Region. Reflecting their conclusions about the economic bases for 
development, some states have subordinated the enforcement of human rights norms in social, 
economic, and political relations to policy goals of economic development. Relying partly on 
a critique of liberal paradigms that limit state involvement in economic life through to 
establishment of free market systems supported by private law rules and institutions,55 the 
right to development has been used to justify continued restriction of effective judicial systems 
that might lay a foundation for meaningful civil and political rights.56  By asserting that 
countries have the right to determine their own political systems through which to pursue 
economic, social, and cultural development, the Bangkok Declaration clearly subordinated 
the pursuit of civil and political rights.57 China’s human rights White Papers emphasize 
suggest that civil and political relations must continually be subordinated to the pursuit of the 
right to development.58 The Director of the State Council Information Office has supported 
                                                 
53 See United Nations General Assembly, Declaration on the Right to Development, supra note 25, Art. 6. 
54 See sources cited in note 20, supra. 
55 Liberal economic policies are seen to undermine local capacity to control foreign capital, as the transnational 
character of foreign business inhibits control by local governments through traditional legal mechanisms. See 
generally, Robert O. Keohane and Ooms Van Doorn, “The Multinational Firm and International Regulation” 
(1975) 29:1 Int’l Org 186 at 186–206. Also see Yash P. Ghai, Robin Luckham, and Francis G. Snyder, eds., The 
Political Economy of Law: A Third World Reader (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1987); Francisco Orrego 
Vicun, “The Control of Multinational Enterprises” in George Modelski, ed., Transnational Corporations and 
World Order: Readings in International Political Economy (San Francisco: W.H. Freeman & Co., 1979) at 296–
308; Franklin B. Weinstein, “Underdevelopment and Efforts to Control Multinational Corporations” in Modelski, 
at 338–46; Ronald Müller, “Poverty is the Product” (Winter 1973–74) 13 Foreign Policy at 71–102; United 
Nations, Multinational Corporations in World Development (New York: United Nations, 1973); and Stephen 
Hymer, “The Multinational Corporation and the Law of Uneven Development” in Jadwish N. Bhagwati, ed., 
Economics and World Order: From the 1970’s to the 1990’s (New York: MacMillan, 1972) at 113–35. In the 
international trade context, see David Kennedy, “Turning to Market Democracy: A Tale of Two Architectures” 
(1991) 32:2 Harv Int’l LJ 373 at 373–96. 
56 Perhaps the most direct expression of this sentiment has been attributed to Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir 
Mohamad: “developing nations cannot always afford luxuries such as human rights . . . liberty must take a back 
seat to the exigency of economic expansion . . . you must eat before you vote.” See Boo Tion Kwa, “Righteous 
Talk” (June 17, 1993) Far Eastern Economic Review at 28. 
57 See Bangkok Declaration, supra note 10, Art. 6. 
58 See “Text of Human Rights White Paper” supra note 35. 
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explicitly the primacy of economic conditions as the basis for development: “[W]e enable our 
people to have the economic foundation upon which they can enjoy political rights.”59 
2. The Nature of Rights 
 Debates over the right to development also reflect fundamental differences about the 
nature of rights. These differences include divergent views on the sources and beneficiaries 
of rights. 
Much of what might be termed the conventional human rights discourse derives from 
European ideas about the nature of rights. The inalienable character of human rights and the 
claim that they are enjoyed by virtue of being human is entrenched in the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights as well as the International Covenants on Civil and Political and 
on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights. These ideas about the inherency of rights reflect 
European natural law theories about the equality of human beings,60 which in turn derived 
from a range of political and economic interests.61 Despite recent efforts to reconceptualize 
rights as claims set in a context of diverse social, political and economic interests,62 the notion 
of inherency retains its appeal and distinguishes the European ideal of rights from that which 
is emerging in the East Asian region.63 
In contrast to natural rights theories that view rights as inalienable and intrinsic to the human 
condition, proponents of the so-called “Asian approach” to rights suggest that rights are 
conferred by social organizations—families, communities, and governments. Under this 
approach rights are not inherent, but rather are specific benefits conferred and enforced at the 
                                                 
59 See “Interview with Zhu Muzhi, Director of the State Council Information Office” (November 2, 1991) 
Xinhua, in FBIS Daily Report-China (November 4, 1991) 15–16 at 16. 
60 See generally Jeffrie G. Murphy and Jules L. Coleman, Philosophy of Law: An Introduction to Jurisprudence, 
rev. ed. (Boulder: Westview Press, 1990). Among the primary sources for this view are Aristotle’s Ethics and 
Politics; Cicero’s The Republic, and Aquinas’ Treatise on Law. Also see generally, Stephen Lukes, Individualism 
(Oxford: Blackwell, 1973) and Joseph Raz, “Rights and Individualism” in The Morality of Freedom (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1986). 
61 Michael E. Tigar and Madeline R. Levy, Law and the Rise of Capitalism (New York: Monthly Review Press, 
1977) and Harold J. Berman, Law and Revolution: The Formation of the Western Legal Tradition (Cambridge, 
Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1985). 
62 See generally, Jeremy Waldron, Theories of Rights (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984) and J. Raz, “On 
the Nature of Rights” (1984) 93:370 Mind 194.  
63 See Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1978). 
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discretion of the state. Such an approach permits governments to silence their critics under the 
guise of legal process. 
Divergent views on the sources of rights have led in turn to significant differences concerning 
the beneficiaries of rights. In keeping with natural law theories that treat rights as inherent to 
human beings, the European liberal tradition has long held that human individuals are the 
primary beneficiaries of rights. 64  Reflecting this tradition, international human rights 
instruments provide that human rights are enjoyed by individuals, while the bulk of scholarly 
literature on human rights suggests as well that the primary beneficiary is the individual.65 
While currently there is a growing body of literature that challenges this view,66 or at least 
suggests that individual rights can be meaningfully enforced only in the context of 
community,67 the primacy of the individual in the dynamic of legal rights and obligations 
remains a dominant feature of European and North American rights doctrine. 
In the course of the human rights discourse, some governments in East Asia for example claim 
that groups and communities should be the primary beneficiaries of rights, and by implication 
at least that the rights of individuals should be subordinated.68 This approach is supported by 
arguments about social and historical traditions, and references to an East Asian familial 
tradition that derives from Confucianism and its assumptions about authority and hierarchy in 
social organization.69 In this regard, it is useful to note that while the tradition of collective 
                                                 
64 See generally, Lukes, supra note 60; Raz, “Rights and Individualism”, supra note 60. 
65  See generally, Hugh M. Kindred, Phillip Martin Saunders, Jutta Brunnée and Robert J. Currie, eds., 
International Law: Chiefly as Interpreted and Applied in Canada (Toronto: Emond Montgomery, 1993), Ch. 10. 
66 See generally, Bryan Schwartz, “Individuals, Groups and Canadian Statecraft” in Richard F. Devlin, ed., 
Canadian Perspectives on Legal Theory (Toronto: Emond Montgomery, 1991) at 39–56. 
67 See e.g. Jeremy Waldron, “Can Communal Goods be Human Rights?” (1987) 28:2 Euro J Sociology 296 and 
Gillian Triggs, “The Rights of Peoples and Individual Rights: Conflict or Harmony?” in James Crawford, The 
Rights of Peoples (Oxford: Clarendon, 1988) at 141–57. 
68 For indicators of the Chinese view, see references to the primacy of national political stability and the livelihood 
of people throughout the country, in “Text of Human Rights White Paper”, supra note 35 at 4 and references to 
human rights conditions of the Chinese people as whole in “Interview with Zhu Muzhi, Director of the State 
Council Information Office” (November 2, 1991) Xinhua, in FBIS Daily Report-China (November 4, 1991) at 
15–16. See e.g. De Jonge, supra note 51. Also see Boo Tion Kwa, supra note 56 at 28. 
69 See generally, Ann Kent, Between Freedom and Subsistence: China and Human Rights (Hong Kong: Oxford 
University Press, 1993) at 30–32 [Kent, Between Freedom and Subsistence]; David E. Christensen, “Breaking 
the Deadlock: Toward a Socialist Confucianist Concept of Human Rights in China” (1992) 13:2 Mich J Int’l L 
469. The importance of Confucianism as a basis for a collectivist legal order is the focus of many officially 
sanctioned studies of Chinese legal culture. See e.g., Chinese Society for the Study of Confucianism and Legal 
Culture, ed., Confucianism and Legal Culture (Shanghai: Fudan University Press, 1992). 
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rights in the Asian tradition is much discussed, there is also significant evidence to suggest 
that the role of the individual was once highly prized.70 The importance of the individual in 
traditional Chinese philosophy, for example, came gradually to be suppressed as a result of 
the political and ideological imperatives of the Chinese state.71  Moreover, it should be noted 
that Confucianism and the collectivist norms it has engendered have been severely criticized 
by many contemporary Chinese thinkers as overly authoritarian and repressive. 72 
Nonetheless, the Confucian tradition remains important in the views of some governments in 
East Asia regarding the beneficiaries of rights. 
These basic differences over nature of development and the nature of rights pose significant 
obstacles to attempts to reconcile differing approaches on the human right to development —
differences which are entrenched further by the institutional contexts within which the various 
views are articulated. In this regard, it is of particular interest to note the emphasis placed by 
the 1993 Bangkok Human Rights Declaration on a “dynamic and evolving process of 
international norm-setting” as a context for human rights ideals.73 This suggests a hope on the 
part of some East Asian governments that the human right to development as a multi-faceted, 
inherent and inalienable right might ultimately yield to a different vision, one that holds the 
right to development as priority that permits economic growth to take precedence over such 
other human rights as may be conferred by state governments on their subjects. 
                                                 
70 See Donald J. Munro, The Concept of Man in Early China (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1969) at 17: 
“all people are equally deserving; all should be tolerated, none singled out for favor”. While the Taoists did 
espouse a primitive solidarity within society, this was derived from a fundamental respect for the identity of the 
individual. See generally, Joseph Needham, Science and Civilization in China, vol. II (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1954) at 99 et seq. and 139 et seq. 
71 For discussion of individualism and its suppression by early Confucian orthodoxy, see Etienne Balazs, Chinese 
Civilization and Bureaucracy, A.F. Wright, ed., trans. H.M. Wright (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1964) 
at 21–22, 177. The emergence of activism and reformism in the “new text Confucianism” of the 19th century 
raised the possibility of increased tolerance for individualistic scholarship and research within the literati elite—
a significant departure from the staid intellectual collectivism of prior years, although this too was ultimately 
unsuccessful. See Benjamin A. Elman, From Philosophy to Philology: Intellectual and Social Aspects of Change 
in Late Imperial China (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1984) at 26–36 and Benjamin A. Elman, 
Classicism, Politics, and Kinship: The Ch’ang-chou School of New Text Confucianism in Late Imperial China 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990), Ch. 9. 
72 See e.g., Bo Yang, The Ugly Chinaman and the Crisis of Chinese Culture, trans. & ed. Don J. Cohn and Jing 
Qing (North Sydney, NSW: Allen & Unwin, 1992); Wang Ruoshui, “Wei rendao zhuyi bianhu” (In defense of 
humanism) in Wang Ruoshui, ed., Wei rendao zhuyi bianhu (Beijing: United Press, 1986) at 217–33. Also see 
Kent, Between Freedom and Subsistence, supra note 69 at 136–53. 
73 See “Final Declaration of the Regional Meeting for Asia of the World Conference on Human Rights”, 
supra note 10, Art. 8. See also Osinbajo & Ajayi, supra note 22. 
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The affirmation of the human right to development has put fundamental questions about 
development and rights on the public agenda of international law and politics. The 
discourse may yield increasingly effective calls for a multi-dimensional approach that 
validates social, cultural, and political development as essential counterparts to economic 
growth. And while it remains to be seen whether authoritarian regimes in the East Asian 
region will come to adopt such an approach in the near term, the liberalization policies of 
Taiwan and South Korea suggest that political self-preservation may mandate the adoption 
of comprehensive development strategies. The development aspirations of the people in 
the region generally would seem to depend on similar transitions from state-controlled uni-
dimensional economic development to a more comprehensive approach. This in turn will 
depend on how the philosophical differences and political implications of the right to 
development are resolved. 
IV. Conclusion 
Enforcement of international human rights norms depends on the capacity of local political 
and legal institutions. Institutional capacity depends on issues of location, orientation, and 
cohesion, but most of all on factors of institutional purpose. Questions about institutional 
purpose invite discussion of the relationship between the goals of certain international 
human rights norms and the goals of local political authorities. The right to development 
offers a vision of human rights that differs markedly from the liberal ideals of individual 
rights, and offers an example of the ways in which the dynamic of selective adaptation 
operates to mediate international norms and local enforcement. Selective adaptation might 
also offer an approach to resolving tensions between conflicting international and local 
human rights norms, and thereby a bases for mutual understanding and common 
commitment to recognizing and protecting the rights of all people.  
